ities, with the quantitative understanding of human behavior under extreme events remaining a crucial missing chapter. This has a wide array of potential applications, ranging from emergency response and detection to traffic control and management. Previous studies have shown that human communications are both temporally and spatially localized following the onset of emergencies, indicating that social propagation is a primary means to propagate situational awareness. We study real anomalous events using country-wide mobile phone data, finding that information flow during emergencies is dominated by repeated communications.
We further demonstrate that the observed communication patterns cannot be explained by inherent reciprocity in social networks, and are universal across different demographics.
Much effort has been devoted to the study of human dynamics under regular and stationary situations 7, 9-11, 15, 16, 19, 23, 28, 30-32, 34, 37, 40, 45 . Our quantitative understanding of human behavior under extreme conditions, such as violent conflicts 5 , life-threatening epidemic outbreaks 3, 9, 10, 25 , and other large-scale emergencies, remains limited however. Yet, it is essential for a number of practical problems faced by emergency response 29 . There is an extraordinary need, therefore, to quantitatively study human dynamics and social interactions under rapidly changing or unfamiliar conditions.
Previous studies 2, 24 have suggested that mobile phones can act as in situ sensors for human behavior during anomalous events, finding that the occurrence of anomalous events triggers a large spike in the communication activity of those who witnessed the event. More specifically, they found that communication spikes following emergencies are temporally and spatially local-ized, indicating information flow through the social networks of affected individuals becomes an important means to spread situational awareness and information to the general population.
In this work, we quantify the propagation of real-world emergency information through the contact networks of mobile phone users. We denote the group of users directly affected by an emergency by population G 0 , while users they contact during the timespan of the emergency that are not in G 0 form the population G 
Data and Events
In this paper, we use a de-identified dataset from a large mobile phone company in a European country 1, 4, 8, 14, 16, 20, 21, 27, 28, 33, 36, 37, 39, [42] [43] [44] . The data consist of approximately 10 million users and four years of cell phone activity, including both voice calls and text messages. Each data entry records the user initiating the call or text (caller) and the user receiving it (callee); the cellular tower that routed the call; and the date and time when it occurred. The locations (longitude and latitude) of cellular towers are also recorded, allowing us to infer the location of callers whenever they initiate a communication. Hence, given the spatiotemporal localization of an event, these data offers a unique opportunity to quantify the social response of the affected population.
To study real events covered by this mobile phone data, we need to determine their time and locations. We study the event set identified in previous studies 2 , where the authors used Google local news (news.google.com) service to search for news stories covering the country and time period of the mobile phone dataset. Keywords such as 'emergency', 'disaster', 'concert', etc. were used to find potential news stories. Important events such as bombings, earthquakes and concerts are prominently covered in the social media. Study of these reports typically gave the precise time and the locations for these events 2 .
To identify the beginning and the end of an event, t start and t stop , we adopt the following procedure 2 . First, we scan all calls in the event region during the day covering the event, giving the event day call volume time series (number of calls per minute) V event (t) 2 . Then, we scan calls for a number of "normal" days, those modulo one week from the event day, exploiting the weekly 4 periodicity of V (t). These normal days' call volume time series are averaged to get V normal . To smooth the time series, call volumes were binned into 10 minute intervals. The standard deviation σ(V normal ) as a function of time is then used to compute z(t) = ∆V (t)/σ(V normal ), where ∆V (t) = V event (t)− V normal is the call volume change during the event day. Finally, the interval [t start , t stop ]
was the longest contiguous run of time intervals where z(t) > z thr , for some fixed cutoff z thr . To be consistent with pervious studies 2 , we chose z thr = 1.5 for all events.
Results
To extract the contact network between users during an event, we track all outgoing calls in order of occurrence during the event's time interval [t start , t stop ]. We therefore identified the individuals located within the event region (G 0 ), as well as a G 1 group consisting of individuals outside the event region but who receive calls from the G 0 group during the event, a G 2 group that receive calls from G 1 , and so on.
To determine how unusual the observed activities are, we compare the call volume during the event to the average call volumes of a number of "normal" days (Sec. ). Since a temporal contact network can always be constructed from mobile phone dataset, even when no event occurs, it is necessary to design a proper control for normal days to make the call volumes between event day
and normal days comparable.
To design a proper control, we study new "cascades" generated by the same eyewitness users The number of G i users will typically be larger than that of g i users and G i users may be more active than g i users, so the normal day's call volume time series, V (t|g i ), must be rescaled when compared to the event day's call volume time series, V (t|G i ). For this purpose, we multiply V (t|g i ) by a constant scaling factor a i ,
where both integrals run over the same "calibration interval" δt, and τ = 0 is the start of the selection window. For most events, we integrate over a 24-hour period two days before the event window. The factor a i was chosen such that the total number of calls during normal time periods for V (t|G i ) is approximately equal to a i V (t|g i ), equalizing the normal-day time series and removing any biases due to |G i | = |g i |. This control procedure allows us to investigate call volume patterns of different user groups.
To explore the call volume patterns in different user groups, we measure the call volume change
for G 0 and G 1 groups as a function of time, where V (t|G i ) is the call volume in the event day and
is the call volume averaged over selected "normal" days.
Previous work has studied several aspects of communication patterns, and found a spike in the volume of phone call activity during an emergency event 2 . Yet, by using the control mentioned above, we find the call volume change for different groups such as G 0 and G 1 exhibits different patterns in different events (Fig. 1 ). More specifically, we observe activity spikes in both G 0 and G 1 groups for three emergency events, referred to as "Jet Scare", "Plane Crash" and "Bombing" (Fig. 1a-c ). Yet in all other events, there is no volume spike for the G 1 group, e.g. "Concert" (Fig. 1d) . These results are consistent with previous findings 2 , showing that the users in the G 1 group are triggered to a higher communication level, characterized by a sharp increase in call volumes, during the emergency events. Yet, it is somewhat puzzling that the call volume change of To quantify the reach of situational awareness, we focus on G 1 and study their communication patterns after receiving a phone call or message from G 0 . As an example, we choose three G 0 users (diamonds) and their related G 1 users (circles) and G 2 users (triangles) in the Bombing event as a sample contact network (Fig. 2a) . There are three types of communication behaviors for users in G 1 : (1) call back to G 0 user(s), which are edges in orange, (2) call forward to G 2 users, edges in purple, and (3) calls to other G 1 user(s), edges in green. We denote these three kinds of communication behaviors with, C 10 , C 12 , and C 11 , respectively. We measure the contributions of these three 7 communication modes to the total activities of G 1 users, finding C 11 constitutes no more than 5% of the total volume of G 1 users' communicating activities (Fig. 2b) . The observed low volume of C 11 among G 1 users during emergencies is somewhat unexpected, given the importance of triadic closure in social communications 6, 17 . Hence, the spike observed in G 1 users in Fig. 1 is mainly determined by C 10 and C 12 .
The existence of different communication modes in G 1 (Fig. 2a) raises an important question:
what is the temporal contribution of C 10 and C 12 to the observed spikes in G 1 users' activities? To this end, we decompose ∆V (t|G 1 ) into V (C 10 ) and V (C 12 ) by modifying the rescaling framework
for i = {0, 2}, where V 1i is the call volume from G 1 (g 1 ) users to G i (g i ) users, and a 1i is a scaling factor modified from Eq. 1 as
In Fig. 3 , we show V (C 10 ) and V (C 12 ) as a function of time. We find that in all three emergency events, V (C 10 ) has evident volume spikes during the event period. And, by comparing Fig. 1 and Fig. 3 , we find the peaks of V (C 10 ) are in close temporal vicinity to those of ∆V (t|G 1 ).
Yet, for Concert (Fig. 3d) , we observed no clear volume spikes. Overall, Fig. 3 demonstrates that In an unweighted network, a general definition of link reciprocity R is to measure the tendency of two nodes to form mutual connections (A → B and B → A) 12, 26, 46 . Hence, R = 1 for a purely bidirectional link, and R = 0 for a unidirectional one. Considering the weighted nature of contact networks 13, 22, 41 , we define the reciprocity of communications between G 0 and G 1 users as
where V x→y is the number of calls from user x to user y within a given period, and | · | is the absolute value. With this definition, two users have a reciprocity ranging from 0 to 1, where R = 1 corresponds to reciprocal links, and R = 0 for non-reciprocal ones.
In Fig. 4 , we show the reciprocity of communications averaged over all pairs of users in G 0
and G 1 for the four events during event periods. We find that, for Bombing, Plane Crash and Jet Scare, the average reciprocity for each emergency event shows a significant increase, deviating by approximately 1.8, 3 and 6 standard deviations from normal days, respectively. This result indicates that the observed increase in "call-back" actions from G 1 to G 0 during these emergency events correspond to behavior change in communications. If the increased call-back were entirely random, the distribution of reciprocity over the G 1 population would be sufficient to explain the resulting call-back, but we do not observe this. For Concert, we observe a decrease in reciprocity comparing to normal periods, with 4.7σ below the averaged reciprocity of normal days, indicating clear distinctions between emergency and non-emergency events.
To test the consistency of our results, we also study reciprocity for other emergency and nonemergency events. As shown in Supplementary Materials Fig. S1 , the reciprocities for Blackout and Earthquake are characterized by only modest increase, well within the range of one standard deviation, reassuring the preceding results on correlations between activity spikes in G 1 (Fig. 3a in   10 Ref. 2 ) and their increase in reciprocity.
Finally, to better understand the origin of the observed increase of reciprocity, we measure the contributions to G 1 users' behavioral change for different demographics. More specifically, we obtained self-reported gender information, available for 88% of users, and consider all communications in which gender information is available for both parties. There are four kinds of coupled pairs between G 0 and G 1 users: male-male (MM), male-female (MF), female-male (FM) and female-female (FF). For each event, we compute the reciprocities for the four different kinds of pairs separately. We also average the reciprocities of the MF and FM pairs as cross-gender pairs (CG), and the MM and FF pairs as same-gender pairs (SG). Interestingly, we find the collective response from different demographics is almost universal (Fig. 5) . That is, for emergency events with significant increases in reciprocity (Jet Scare and Plane Crash), the reciprocities across different gender pairs are all several standard deviations larger than normal periods (Fig. 4 (a) and (b)).
Discussion
Taken together, we have studied the cell phone communications during anomalous events, and find volume spikes in G 1 's communication compared to normal days in three emergencies. To uncover the possible origin of the volume spikes, we decomposed G 1 's communications into callback (C 10 ) and call-forward (C 12 ) actions. Comparing to non-emergency events, we found that the dominant component of volume spikes is C 10 for all three emergency events, indicating the need for correspondence with eyewitnesses is more critical than the dissemination of situational awareness during emergencies. We further demonstrated such communication patterns correspond to a behavior change in G 1 users that cannot be explained by reciprocity or demographics. We believe the empirical findings reported in this paper present relevant information that can be used to benchmark potential models, and will play an increasingly important role as large-scale data flourish and our quantitative understanding human behavior deepens. Normal Day
